Non-technical summary
A central conjecture of the work by Meese and Rogo¤ (1983, 1988) is that the presence of timevarying parameters is a key explanation for the failure of exchange rate models to predict future currency movements. However, time-varying parameters may not only help explain the weak out-ofsample predictive power of exchange rate models, but also the ex-post instability in the relationship between exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals, as pointed out by growing evidence in the empirical literature. van Wincoop (2004, 2009 ) propose a scapegoat theory to explain the instability in the relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals. The scapegoat theory suggests that this instability is not explained by frequent and large changes in structural parameters, even when allowing for rationality of agents and Bayesian learning, but rather by expectations about these structural parameters. The scapegoat theory starts from the premise that while agents may have a fairly accurate idea about the relationship between fundamentals and exchange rates in the longrun, there is signi…cant uncertainty about the structural parameters over the short-to medium-term.
This implies that when currency movements over the short-to medium-term are inconsistent with their priors about the underlying structural relationships, agents search for scapegoats to account for these inconsistencies. Such currency movements may be driven by unobservable fundamentals, yet for agents it may be rational to assign additional weight to some fundamental, thus making it a scapegoat, for observed exchange rate changes.
The present paper constitutes an empirical test of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates. We do so by exploiting two novel data sources. Exchange rate scapegoats stem from monthly surveys of 40-60 …nancial market participants, who are asked to rate on a quantitative scale the importance of six key variables (short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates, growth, in ‡ation, current account, equity ‡ows) as drivers of a country's exchange rate vis-a-vis a reference currency. We match this survey data with a novel data set on FX order ‡ow as a proxy of unobservable factors driving exchange rates. The data are proprietary customer transactions from one of the major players in the FX market in terms of market share. The empirical estimations are conducted for 12 currencies (6 of advanced and 6 of emerging economies) individually over this 9-year period, using monthly data frequency.
We present and test two main hypotheses of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates. The …rst hypothesis inherent in the theory is that the inclusion of scapegoats improves the power of fundamentals in explaining exchange rate movements. We …nd that the scapegoat model performs signi…cantly better than two alternative benchmark models and across three criteria to assess the in-sample model performance of the models. Moreover, the magnitude of the improvement in the performance by the scapegoat model is substantial, with e.g. the adjusted-R 2 increasing from about 10% for the time-varying parameter model to, on average, 40% for the scapegoat model, and the hit ratio of correctly explained directional FX changes rising to about 75% for the scapegoat model.
The second hypothesis of the scapegoat theory relates to the determinants of the scapegoat factors themselves, and the question which macroeconomic fundamental becomes a scapegoat at which point in time. Bacchetta and van Wincoop's scapegoat theory states that a fundamental becomes a scapegoat if the size of the deviation from its equilibrium is large and there is a sizeable shock to unobservable fundamentals. We indeed …nd empirical support for this hypothesis as a macroeconomic fundamental is picked and identi…ed by market participants as a scapegoat in periods when it shows large movements and tends to be out of sync with its own longer-term equilibrium, and at the same time the unobservable fundamental is large. Overall, this empirical evidence is remarkably strong and robust, as it holds for all currency groups and for all macroeconomic variables in our sample.
Taken together, these two pieces of empirical evidence provide strong support in favour of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates. The …ndings of the various tests are mutually consistent and suggest that the high degree of instability in the relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals is to a signi…cant extent explained by the presence of scapegoats. In other words, in their attempt to gauge what factors may drive exchange rates market participants have a tendency to single out individual macro variables, which tend to be those that seem of out sync with their own longer term equilibrium, and in particular in times when exchange rate movements are large. Overall, the …nd-ings have implications for exchange rate modelling, suggesting that a more accurate understanding of exchange rates requires taking into account the role of scapegoat factors, and their time-varying nature.
"The FX market sometimes seems like a serial monogamist. It concentrates on one issue at a time, but the issue is replaced frequently. Dollar weakness and US policy have captured its heart. But uncertainties are being resolved ... The market may move back to an earlier love ..." (Financial Times, November 8, 2010) 1 Introduction A central conjecture of the work by Meese and Rogo¤ (1983a,b; 1988) is that the presence of timevarying parameters may be a key explanation for the failure of exchange rate models to predict future currency movements. However, time-varying parameters may not only help explain the weak out-ofsample predictive power of exchange rate models, but also the ex-post instability in the relationship between exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals, as pointed out by a growing literature.
For example, Rossi (2006) …nds a high degree of parameter instability for a broad set of models and speci…cations. Sarno and Valente (2009) show that the relevance of information contained in fundamentals changes frequently over time, while Cheung and Chinn (2001) illustrate through US survey data the sharp shifts in the importance foreign exchange (FX) traders attach to di¤erent fundamentals over time.
In a series of papers, van Wincoop (2004, 2011) propose a scapegoat theory to explain the instability in the relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals. The scapegoat theory suggests that this instability is not explained by frequent and large changes in structural parameters, even when allowing for rationality of agents and Bayesian learning, but rather by expectations about these structural parameters. 1 The scapegoat theory starts from the premise that, even though agents may have a fairly accurate idea about the relationship between fundamentals and exchange rates in the long-run, there is signi…cant uncertainty about the structural parameters over the short to medium term. This implies that when currency movements over the short to medium term are inconsistent with their priors about the underlying structural relationships, agents search for scapegoats to account for these inconsistencies. Such currency movements may be driven by unobservable fundamentals, yet for agents it may be rational to assign additional weight to some fundamental, thus making it a scapegoat for observed exchange rate changes.
In fact, there is ample anecdotal evidence -as illustrated in the quote above -that …nancial market participants blame individual fundamentals for exchange rate movements, with such blame often shifting rapidly across di¤erent fundamentals over time. The scapegoat theory by van Wincoop (2004, 2011) entails that a particular fundamental is more likely to become a scapegoat the larger the (unexplained) exchange rate movement and the more this particular fundamental seems out of line with its long-run equilibrium, but consistent with the observed direction of the exchange rate movement. Over the short-run, both the scapegoat fundamental as well as the unobservable fundamental may thus help explain exchange rate movements. As a …nal step, van Wincoop (2009, 2011) calibrate their model for …ve currencies of industrialized countries, using monetary fundamentals, to investigate its ability to match the moments of the fundamentals and exchange rates. 2 The present paper constitutes -to our knowledge -the …rst empirical test of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates. An important di¢ culty in designing an empirical test in this context involves …nding a suitable proxy for the weight assigned to individual economic fundamentals by market participants (needed to identify scapegoats), and a proxy for the unobservable fundamental (e.g. customer trades in FX markets). We do so by exploiting novel data on exchange rate scapegoats from surveys of a broad set of investors, as well as proxies of unobservable fundamentals based on FX order ‡ow. Exchange rate scapegoats stem from monthly surveys of 40-60 …nancial market participants, who are asked to rate on a quantitative scale the importance of six key variables (shortterm interest rates, long-term interest rates, growth, in ‡ation, current account, equity ‡ows) as drivers of a country's exchange rate vis-a-vis its reference currency. 3 This survey data is available over a 9-year period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ) for a panel of currencies of advanced and emerging economies. Thus, the data allows us to extract quantitative scapegoat measures for each of these six fundamentals over time and across currencies. We match this survey data with a novel dataset on FX order ‡ow as a proxy of unobservable factors driving exchange rates. The order ‡ow data are proprietary customer transactions from one of the major players in the FX market in terms of market share, namely UBS. The empirical estimations are conducted for 12 currencies (6 of advanced and 6 of emerging economies) individually over this 9-year period, using data at monthly frequency.
We present and test two main hypotheses of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates. The …rst hypothesis inherent in the theory is that the inclusion of scapegoats (surveys) improves the power of fundamentals in explaining exchange rate movements. We test this hypothesis by examining two speci…cations of the scapegoat model: one based on constant parameters following Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2011) , and (a more realistic) one based on time-varying parameters as in the earlier version of . We test these two speci…cations of the scapegoat model against two alternative benchmark exchange rate models, one based on constant parameters and one based 2 In other words, in these papers Bacchetta and van Wincoop carry out simulations assuming a model of determination of the exchange rate and showing that allowing for scapegoat e¤ects enables them to match the moments of exchange rates and fundamentals data. Our paper may be seen as a companion paper to their scapegoat theory and their calibration exercises in that we test empirically, rather than calibrate, the scapegoat model by using data on FX scapegoats.
3 Speci…cally, with the exception of the current account all variables are measured as di¤erentials relative to the country of the reference currency. The reference currency is mostly the US dollar.
on time-varying parameters with Bayesian updating for the macroeconomic variables. Moreover, we use three criteria for the comparison of in-sample model performance across models -one based on the adjusted R 2 , a second on an information criterion, and a third on market-timing (directional accuracy) tests. The empirical results show that the scapegoat model with time-varying parameters performs signi…cantly better than the benchmark models, and does so across all three performance criteria. Moreover, the magnitude of the improvement in the performance of the scapegoat model over the benchmark models is substantial. For instance, the adjusted R 2 increases from about 11 percent for the time-varying parameter model without scapegoats to, on average across currencies, 27 percent with scapegoats. The hit ratio of correctly explained directional FX changes rises from about 59 percent for the benchmark models to about 70 percent for the scapegoat model with time-varying parameters across the 12 currencies. We also …nd that the scapegoat model with constant parameters performs satisfactorily. It generally outperforms its respective benchmark model based on constant parameters, but more surprisingly it also yields a better performance than the more complex model with time-varying parameters in a few cases. This may suggest that the use of scapegoat variables per se is su¢ cient to capture the unstable relationship between fundamentals and exchange rates, at least for some currencies. 4 More generally, the results show that the improvement in the in-sample explanatory power of the scapegoat model does not only stem from the inclusion of the order ‡ow variable, but also from the inclusion of the scapegoat parameters themselves. This …nding is relevant because it suggests that while order ‡ow is important in accounting for currency movements, the scapegoat parameters have an additional, sizeable explanatory power. In fact, the joint role of order ‡ow and scapegoat parameters is a necessary condition for the scapegoat e¤ect to arise. Again, these …ndings are robust across currencies as well as across macro fundamentals as scapegoats.
The second hypothesis of the scapegoat theory relates to the determinants of the scapegoat factors themselves, and the question about which macroeconomic fundamental becomes a scapegoat, and at which point in time. Bacchetta and van Wincoop's scapegoat theory states that a macro fundamental becomes a scapegoat if there is a sizeable shock to unobservable fundamentals, and at the same time the size of the deviation of the macro fundamental from its equilibrium is large and theoretically consistent with the observed direction of change in the exchange rate. We indeed …nd empirical support for this hypothesis. In fact, a macroeconomic fundamental is picked and identi…ed by market participants as a scapegoat at times when (i) the unobservable fundamental experiences a large shock, (ii) the fundamental tends to be out of sync with its own longer-term equilibrium (e.g. experiences abnormal values) and (iii) moves in a direction that is consistent with the observed movements in the exchange rate.
Taken together, these two pieces of empirical evidence provide strong support in favor of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates. The …ndings of the various tests are mutually consistent and suggest that the high degree of instability in the relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals is to a signi…cant extent explained by the presence of scapegoats. In other words, in their attempt to gauge what factors may drive exchange rates market participants have a tendency to single out individual macro variables, which tend to be those that are out of sync with their own longer term equilibrium or experience abnormal values, and in particular at times when exchange rate movements are also large. Overall, these …ndings have important implications for exchange rate modelling, suggesting that a more accurate understanding of exchange rates requires taking into account the role of scapegoat factors, and their time-varying nature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the main elements of Bacchetta and van Wincoop's scapegoat theory of exchange rates, and describes its testable empirical implications. Section 3 presents the data used for the empirical analysis, focusing in particular on the measurement of exchange rate scapegoats, and also discusses the empirical methodology underlying our estimations. The empirical …ndings are then presented in Section 4, going through the two hypotheses outlined above. Section 5 concludes.
Scapegoat theory and hypotheses
The essence of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates is that some macroeconomic factors receive an unusually large weight and thus are made scapegoats of exchange rate movements. Such episodes can happen when investors do not know the true model of exchange rates or the true parameters of the model, and when some of the drivers of exchange rate ‡uctuations are unobservable. 5 In particular, the weight or scapegoat role of a macroeconomic variable is higher when both the role of the unobservable for currency movements is larger, and the macroeconomic fundamental shows large variation which is consistent with the observed movement in the exchange rate. Such "rational confusion" arises because agents make inference on the true parameter only conditioning on observable fundamentals and exchange rate movements at times when the exchange rate is instead driven by unobservables (e.g. large customer order ‡ows). Thus, when exchange rates move strongly in response to changes in the unobservables, it is rational for agents to blame factors that they can actually observe, and more precisely those macro fundamentals that are out of sync from their longer term equilibrium values. This scapegoat e¤ect, or rational confusion, can generate an unstable relationship between 5 In this paper the words agents and investors are used interchangeably. exchange rates and macro fundamentals. More precisely, the relationship between the exchange rate and fundamentals is determined mainly by the expectation of the structural parameters and not by the structural parameters themselves, and such expectations can exhibit large short-term ‡uctuations and thus generate scapegoat e¤ects. Next, we describe such e¤ects, following two related models developed by van Wincoop (2009, 2011) . We then introduce our main hypotheses for the empirical test of the scapegoat model of exchange rates. Finally, we motivate and present two fundamental-based exchange rate models which benchmark the scapegoat model.
The scapegoat model of exchange rates
Bacchetta and van Wincoop describe the scapegoat e¤ect in a series of papers (2004, 2006, 2009, 2011) . These papers di¤er for a number of reasons, although they have the same central theme.
For example, van Wincoop (2004, 2006) assume that agents have heterogeneous information, whereas van Wincoop (2009, 2011 ) develop a dynamic model where the exchange rate is forward looking and depends on expectations of future fundamentals. examine the case where parameters are unknown and time-varying, whereas Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2011) show that the scapegoat e¤ect can arise also with unknown and constant parameters. In practise, there are many ways in which parameter uncertainty can be generated. What is crucial to generate a scapegoat e¤ect, however, is the uncertainty of structural parameters attached to fundamentals, combined with the role of unobserved fundamentals: put simply, agents do not know the coe¢ cients of the model and do not observe one of the fundamentals.
To a large extent, the di¤erent models of Bacchetta and van Wincoop share similar empirical implications. Hence, our empirical test can be seen more generally as a test of the scapegoat e¤ect, which is central to all of the above papers, although we follow closely van Wincoop (2009, 2011) in what follows. We start by presenting their key equation describing the scapegoat e¤ect when parameters are constant but unknown. Then, we move to describing the more general case with time-varying parameters. Starting with a standard formulation of the exchange rate as the present value of future fundamentals, in the vein of Engel and West (2005) , and using …rst di¤erences, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2011) derive the following equation:
where s t is the log nominal exchange rate (expressed as the foreign price of the domestic currency), f t = (f 1;t ; f 2;t ; : : : ; f N;t ) 0 is a vector of N observed macro fundamentals (expressed in …rst di¤erences), = ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; N ) 0 is the vector of time-varying true structural parameters, E t is the vector of expected structural parameters, b t is the unobserved fundamental, and is the discount factor. Thus, the true structural parameters are constant but are unknown to investors, who learn over time about through observing the exchange rate and the macro fundamentals. Precisely, each period t they observe the signal f t + b t . However, both the parameters and the fundamental b t are unknown to them. As a result, although they can eventually learn about the structural parameters, this can only happen slowly over time.
Equation (1) also shows that the fundamentals f t are multiplied by a weighted average of actual and expected parameters. However, higher weights are attached to the expected values of the parameters rather than the actual values, since the discount factor is smaller than but close to unity (see Engel and West, 2005; Sarno and Sojli, 2009) . 6 Moreover, even though the parameters themselves are constant, the expectations of the parameters can change signi…cantly over time. Precisely, the impact of macro fundamentals on the exchange rate in the scapegoat model can be formulated as:
Interestingly, the derivative of the exchange rate with respect to the fundamentals not only depends on the expectation of the structural parameters but also on the derivative of the structural parameters with respect to the fundamental. The latter term re ‡ects a transitory e¤ect which can generate high-frequency ‡uctuations. Such ‡uctuations would complement the short to medium term deviations already generated by variations in the expectation of the structural parameters. As a result, the uncertainty about the level of the parameters can determine transitory and persistent ‡uctuations in the level of the exchange rate. In turn, these ‡uctuations can induce instability in the relationship between exchange rates and macro fundamentals.
In short, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2011) show that the scapegoat e¤ect can exist even if the true structural parameters are constant. 7 However, in this model agents eventually learn the true value of the parameters. By contrast, in an earlier version of the model, made the more realistic assumption that structural parameters vary over time. For this reason, we now introduce their original speci…cation:
where t = ( 1;t ; 2;t ; : : : ; N;t ) 0 is the vector of time-varying true structural parameters, and E t t = (E t 1;t ; E t 2;t ; : : : ; E t N;t ) 0 is the vector of expected parameters at time t. The true structural 6 More precisely, just as a fundamental may at times receive a larger weight in investors'trading decisions over the short-term, it may at other times receive too little weight. The model by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2011) entails that in the long-run investors know the true structural parameters, which should imply that these long-run structural parameters should match the average scapegoat parameters. 7 Another simpli…cation in their model set-up is the exclusion of risk premia. They show that the inclusion of risk premia does not materially alter the …ndings about the importance of scapegoats. parameters t now vary over time but are again unknown to investors. While investors may know the value of these structural parameters over the long-run, they may not know their value and time variation in the short to medium term. For this reason, some observable macro fundamental may at times be given an "excessive" weight by investors, in the sense that the fundamental is given more weight over the short-term than the longer-term structural relationship of the fundamental with the exchange rate entails. This fundamental then becomes a natural scapegoat and in ‡uences the trading strategies of investors. Therefore, in equation (3), the expectations of structural parameters directly determine changes in the exchange rate.
Empirical scapegoat models
We now turn to stating the empirical hypotheses to test this scapegoat theory. Our …rst research hypothesis is that scapegoat e¤ects are empirically powerful in explaining exchange rate movements.
In order to test this hypothesis, we estimate the following two empirical scapegoat models of exchange rates. The …rst is the empirical counterpart to equation (1):
where t is the vector of scapegoat parameters E t . We identify the latter by using survey data, and the theoretical unobserved fundamental b t is proxied by FX order ‡ow x t ; the measurement of both t and x t is described in detail in Section 3. The second model we estimate is the empirical counterpart to equation (3):
where the structural parameters are now time-varying, and t denotes the vector of scapegoat parameter E t t . It is also apparent that the last term in equation (3), which captures the change in the expectations of past parameters interacted with past fundamentals, is missing from equation (5).
This term is dropped as data on current and lagged expectations of past parameters are hard to measure empirically, and may also be of second-order importance relative to the current scapegoat parameter. 8 In order to gauge the e¤ect of fundamentals on exchange rates, we need to determine the evolution over time of the underlying structural relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals.
Investors may know the process that determines the evolution of t , even if the actual levels of the structural parameters are unknown to them. We consider the case where each structural parameter n;t evolves as a driftless random walk:
n;t = n;t 1 + v n;t :
This is a widely used process in the empirical literature on modelling time-varying parameters (e.g.
see Cogley and Sargent, 2002; Primiceri, 2005; Rossi, 2005) , and is also used in . We assume homoskedastic errors and uncorrelated factors, so that v t is a vector of normally distributed error terms with zero mean and diagonal covariance matrix Q. Both these assumptions can be easily relaxed, and are not crucial to our analysis. 9
As to our null hypothesis, we expect to be statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero and correctly signed. Of course, for some variables the interpretation of the sign is not clear-cut (e.g. equity ‡ows). Moreover, we may expect the parameters and to be consistent with each others.
We also expect the order ‡ow parameter to be negative, implying that when the buying pressure for the foreign currency increases the domestic currency depreciates (Evans and Lyons, 2002; Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2004 , 2011 . More generally, the test of the scapegoat model of exchange rates rests on the comparison of the empirical estimation of models (4) and (5) with some benchmark models, using appropriate metrics of evaluation.
The second main hypothesis of the scapegoat theory relates to the determinants of the scapegoat parameter n;t itself. What determines the evolution of this parameter? When does a macro fundamental become a scapegoat? The papers by van Wincoop (2009, 2011) show that a particular macro fundamental is more likely to become a scapegoat when there are large shocks to the unobservable b t and this fundamental is out of sync with its longer term equilibrium value. We formulate an empirical test for this hypothesis in the empirical work discussed below.
Exchange rate models to benchmark the scapegoat model
An important issue is how to benchmark the scapegoat models, i.e. with which alternative models to compare their explanatory power. One natural candidate is a basic macro model with constant and known parameters. Such fundamental-based exchange rate model is consistent with the notion that the exchange rate is given by the present value of current and expected future fundamentals (Mark, 1995; Engel and West, 2005; Engle, Mark and West, 2008) . This model can be easily rewritten in …rst di¤erences, so that changes in the exchange rate s t depend on changes in the fundamentals f t :
The model in equation (7) is a logical benchmark for the constant-parameter scapegoat model, CP SCA, given in equation (4). However, there is overwhelming evidence of parameter instability in empirical exchange rate models (Rossi, 2005) . This instability may be rationalized on a number of grounds, including policy regime changes, instabilities in the money demand or purchasingpower-parity equations, or also agents'heterogeneity leading to di¤erent responses to macroeconomic developments over time (e.g. see Schinasi and Swamy, 1989; Rossi, 2005 Rossi, , 2006 ). An alternative explanation is that frequent shifts in the parameters can result when models, which optimally use the information in the fundamentals, experience large and frequent changes in structural parameters (Sarno and Valente, 2009) . For these reasons a second potential benchmark is a model that accounts for parameter instability. We therefore use a second benchmark speci…cation that allows for timevarying parameters, and which constitutes the benchmark for the scapegoat model with time-varying parameters, T V P SCA given in equation (5):
Note that both benchmark models in equations (7) and (8) assume that parameters are known to the investors. However, the latter model also allows parameters to vary over time, and the unstable relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals is generated by parameters being volatile. In contrast, originally assumed that the investors cannot observe directly the (shocks to the) structural parameters t . Agents observe the signal f 0 t t + b t through the change in the exchange rate, but because the order ‡ow is unobservable to them the only extra piece of information they have is f t . As a result, large changes in the unobservable combined with large changes in the observed fundamental can easily alter agents' expectations. Thus, agents can naturally change their expectations of the structural parameters even if t were actually zero. 10
Data and econometric methodology
This section starts by outlining the data, and speci…cally how we measure FX scapegoats as well as order ‡ow and macro fundamentals. We then proceed by discussing our empirical methodology.
Data on scapegoats and fundamentals
We employ a novel dataset to measure when and which fundamentals are used as scapegoats for exchange rate movements by …nancial market participants. The aim is to extract a quantitative measure of the importance that investors attach to di¤erent macroeconomic fundamentals to explain exchange rates at a particular point in time.
The data is based on surveys of 40-60 FX market participants from major …nancial institutions (mostly asset managers) conducted monthly by Consensus Economics. These market participants reside in many di¤erent locations globally, though the majority is located in the US, the UK and other advanced economies. The participants are asked to "rank the current importance of a range of di¤erent factors in determining exchange rate movements" for each of a broad set of currencies bilaterally vis-a-vis a reference currency, which is mostly the US dollar and vis-a-vis the euro for some European currencies. For the euro, Japanese yen and UK pound, the exchange rates considered are vis-a-vis the US dollar.
More precisely, participants are asked to rank six key macroeconomic factors on a scale from 0 (no in ‡uence) to 10 (very strong in ‡uence). The six key variables are short-term interest rates, longterm interest rates, growth, in ‡ation, trade/current account, and equity ‡ows. The survey explicitly stresses that the weights should be for the variables relative to those of the country of the reference currency. 11
Consensus Economics conducts the surveys monthly with the same …nancial market participants, so that the change in participants is relatively small. However, Consensus Economics conducts several surveys on exchange rates with these market participants (such as about short-term forecasts, longerterm forecasts, expected trading ranges, and market uncertainty), and alternates across these surveys over the months. This means that the surveys about FX scapegoats is conducted only between every a large panel of currencies of advanced and emerging economies. We reduce our country sample to those 12 currencies for which we have survey data for the full 9-year period, 6 being currencies of advanced countries (Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, euro, Japanese yen, Swiss franc, and UK pound) and 6 emerging market, or EM, currencies (Czech koruna, Mexican peso, Polish zloty, South African rand, Singaporean dollar, and Korean won). Another important criterion for the selection of EM currencies is that these six are among the most freely ‡oating EM currencies, though all may have experienced periods of interventions by their monetary authorities. Table 1 shows summary statistics about the scapegoat surveys for the 12 currencies in our sample. A …rst interesting fact is that the six macro variables have mostly similar means and standard deviations across all 12 currencies and over time. A somewhat higher mean is recorded for short-term interest rates, and a somewhat lower mean for in ‡ation as scapegoat. However, there are some revealing di¤erences across currencies, in particular between advanced and EM currencies.
For instance, in ‡ation has never been the single most important scapegoat for advanced countries' currencies over the past decade, which seems reasonable given that in ‡ation and in ‡ation di¤erentials have been relatively stable in the industrialized world over this period. Short-term interest rates have been the dominant scapegoat for advanced currencies relatively more frequently, whereas for EM currencies growth di¤erentials and the current account have been more frequently considered by investors as the main scapegoats. Figure 1 also shows the time variations of the scapegoat factors for some advanced and EM currencies, which is useful to illustrate how the weights investors attach to macro fundamentals can change substantially over time, and the main scapegoat changes fairly frequently.
We match the monthly scapegoat data with the actual macroeconomic fundamentals for these six variables. To obtain monthly data, we use the trade balance instead of the current account, and use interpolated monthly GDP growth …gures. The data source for all macro series is the IMF's International Financial Statistics. To be as consistent as possible with the surveys, actual macroeconomic fundamentals are calculated relative to those of the country of the reference currency.
As to the scaling of the scapegoat variables, we scale each scapegoat variable for each currency so that its mean and standard deviation are identical to those of the underlying actual macroeconomic variable. Table 2 o¤ers summary statistics for the actual macro fundamentals with all variables, except the current account, being measured relative to the reference currency.
A …nal point concerns the exchange rate data. Given the survey questions, we use nominal bilateral exchange rate changes vis-a-vis the reference currency, in the benchmark speci…cation using changes over the past month. As we know the precise day when the surveys were conducted, these exchange rate changes are calculated relative to the market closing of the previous business day.
Data on order ‡ow
The other important data for the empirical test of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates is on order ‡ow. Our rationale is as follows. Bacchetta and van Wincoop's papers stress the key role of unobservables, in particular unobservable trades, as drivers of exchange rates. It is hence important to try and capture such unobservables for two reasons. First, to test whether unobservables as captured and proxied by order ‡ow exert a signi…cant e¤ect on monthly exchange rate changes; and second, it is important to control for unobservables in order to test whether scapegoats exert an additional e¤ect on exchange rates. 13 We use a comprehensive proprietary dataset of order ‡ow for all 12 currencies in our sample over the entire 2001-2009 period. These order ‡ow series are bilateral vis-a-vis the reference currency.
The source of the data is UBS, and these data are not made public by UBS, constituting therefore a genuine unobservable for investors in the FX market. To match the order ‡ow data to the scapegoat data, we calculate the cumulative monthly order ‡ow, aggregating daily order ‡ow data, on the business day previous to the latest scapegoat survey and over the previous month.
Note that we have available order ‡ow from di¤erent types of customers for the advanced economies, but not for EM economies. Therefore we use total order ‡ow for EM currencies, whereas we use (the sum of) hedge funds and asset managers order ‡ow for advanced countries. This is because the order ‡ow of sophisticated investors is more likely to capture the unobservable shock in the theory of Bacchetta and van Wincoop. Moreover, we suspect that total order ‡ow in EM economies is vastly dominated by sophisticated investors, so that the use of total order ‡ow seems appropriate. Table 3 provides some summary statistics of the order ‡ow series for each of the 12 currencies in our sample, indicating that order ‡ow does ‡uctuate considerably over time.
The FX microstructure approach has surged since Evans and Lyons (2002) …rst documented that order ‡ow explains a substantial proportion of the ‡uctuations in major exchange rates, a result that stands in contrast with decades of failure to …nd a satisfactory empirical macroeconomic model of exchange rate behavior. Evans and Lyons (2005) subsequently show that order ‡ow contains predictive power and outperforms a random walk in an out-of-sample forecasting exercise using conventional statistical criteria. Similarly, Rime, Sarno and Sojli (2010) …nd that order ‡ow models generate substantial economic gains to an investor in a dynamic asset allocation setting. The explanatory and forecasting power of order ‡ow has been mainly linked to macroeconomic news (e.g. Dominguez and Panthaki, 2006; Berger et al., 2008; Love and Payne, 2008; Evans and Lyons, 2008) , changes in expectations about the macroeconomy (Rime, Sarno and Sojli, 2010) , and signals on the current state of the economy (Evans and Lyons 2005, 2006) .
Econometric methodology
In van Wincoop (2009, 2011) , the scapegoat models not only include macro factors with loadings that either vary over time or are constant, but also the expectation of future parameters and unobserved fundamentals. For convenience, we repeat equation (5) for our empirical version of the scapegoat model with time-varying parameters
where t denotes the survey (scapegoat) parameters, which capture the expectation of future parameters and weights the information in the macro factors; and x t is order ‡ow, which proxies for the unobservable fundamentals. In the estimation, all variables are separately standardized in such a way that they have zero mean and unit variance. 14 From an econometric point of view our empirical scapegoat model consists of estimating a model with both time-varying parameters ( t ) and time-invariant parameters ( and ). We perform a
Bayesian estimation of the parameters of the empirical exchange rate models in this paper, following e.g. Kim and Nelson (1999) and Cogley and Sargent (2002) . The use of Bayesian estimation methods in this context is particularly appropriate for at least two reasons. First, it allows us to account for uncertainty surrounding parameter estimates in the model, which is important given our relatively small number of observations. Second, it allows us to make no assumption about the order of integration of the variables in the model. This is relevant since, while exchange rate returns are clearly stationary, the fundamentals are persistent, and this is known to complicate statistical inference in empirical exchange rate regressions.
We use the Gibbs sampler to simulate draws from the posterior distribution. The Gibbs sampler, which belongs to the family of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, decomposes the original estimation problem into (tractable) independent ones. In this way we can sample iteratively from the conditional densities of the parameters blocks. Precisely, all parameters are drawn sequentially from their full conditional posterior distribution. For the constant-parameters linear models, we simply draw the hyperparameters conditional on the data. By contrast, in the models with timevarying parameters there are two main steps. First, we draw a history of states conditional on the data and the hyperparameters using the Carter and Kohn (1994) simulation smoother. Then, we draw the hyperparameters, conditional on the data and the states. By repeatedly simulating from the known conditional distribution of each block in turn, we get samples of draws. These draws, beyond a burn-in period, are treated as variates from the target posterior distribution. More precisely, for the time-varying parameter models we perform 80,000 replications of which the …rst 40,000 are burned-in, and we save 1 every 10 draws of the last 40,000 replications of the chain so that the draws are independent.
The priors used in this paper are di¤use, and their distributions are chosen for convenience following a number of papers (e.g. Koop, 2003; Kim and Nelson, 1999; Cogley and Sargent, 2002; Primiceri, 2005) . For example, it is convenient to assume that the initial states for the time-varying coe¢ cients, and the hyperparameters, are independent of each other. The priors for the covariances of the state innovations are assumed to be distributed as inverse-Wishart so that also the posterior has an inverse-Wishart distribution. Similarly, assuming an inverse-Gamma distribution for the measurement innovations implies that the posterior is distributed as an inverse-Gamma. In the scapegoat model, the constant parameters are drawn from a normal distribution given that the prior is also assumed to be normal. The priors for the initial states of the time-varying coe¢ cients are assumed to be normally distributed. Finally, the Bayesian linear regression algorithm implements a simple MCMC assuming an independent inverse Gamma-Normal prior distribution (for details see Kim and Nelson, 1999) . The MCMC algorithm for each of the estimated models is described in more detail in Appendix B.
Empirical results
We now turn to the empirical results. Our focus is on the empirical model speci…cations outlined above, with the six macro fundamentals available in the scapegoat survey data: growth, in ‡ation, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, current account, and equity ‡ows. All these variables, except the current account, are computed as di¤erential with respect to the domestic variable, e.g. for the short-term interest rate f i ST ;t = i ST i ST , where (*) denotes the foreign country.
Before turning to the empirical results, it is important to explain how we choose the observed fundamentals. We use three fundamentals per regression. Ideally, we would like to use all the six macro fundamentals, so that each of the six observable variables has a chance of being selected as the scapegoat by investors. However, the use of too many fundamentals would make the estimation unfeasible (in particular when the parameters are time-varying). Thus, we restrict our attention to only three fundamentals, which are allowed to be country speci…c. We use a general-to-speci…c method to select the set of three fundamentals, for each exchange rate. Precisely, we regress s t on the second term of equation (5):
s t = 1 1;t f 1;t + : : : + 6 6;t f 6;t + u t ;
and we exclude the variable associated with the lowest t-statistic. We repeat the same procedure sequentially until we end up with the three most relevant (statistically signi…cant) macro variables, for each exchange rate. In short, we use regression (10) to pre-screen the scapegoats and reduce the number of potential scapegoats from six to three in order to make the subsequent estimation feasible and reduce estimation error. Table 4 summarizes the estimates of the model with constant parameters (CP M ACRO in equation (7)). The table contains point estimates and one-standard deviation Bayesian con…dence intervals (in squared brackets). However, from Table 4 we can also see the set of variables selected by our general-to-speci…c method for each country. Growth di¤erentials, short term interest rate differentials, and equity ‡ows di¤erentials are selected for most of the industrialized countries, whereas the current account is only chosen for the euro and the Swiss franc, and in ‡ation is chosen only for the yen. By contrast, interest rate, growth and equity ‡ows di¤erentials, are particularly important for EM economies.
We proceed column-by-column, thus interpreting the coe¢ cient of each macro fundamental in turn. We …nd that growth has the expected negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient for the Canadian dollar, the Singaporean dollar, the yen and the South Korean won, so that the currency of the faster growing country appreciates. We also …nd that the Polish zloty rises when the in ‡ation di¤erential falls, as its purchasing power increases relative to the US dollar, but this e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. By contrast, the yen and Singaporean dollar appreciate when in ‡ation rises. Moreover, we …nd the traditional forward bias since the loading on the short-term interest rate di¤erential is always lower than unity. Also, the sign of the loading on the long rate di¤erential is mostly negative for industrialized economies, and positive for EM economies with the only exception of the Mexican peso. A current account de…cit is associated with a weaker currency for the euro, the South African rand and the South Korean won, but it takes a counterintuitive positive sign for the Swiss franc.
Finally, with the only exception of the UK pound, we …nd that as equity in ‡ows in the domestic country rise relative to the in ‡ows in the foreign country, the domestic currency appreciates. Table 5 presents the estimates of the time-invariant coe¢ cients ( , and ) of the scapegoat model with constant parameters (CP SCA in equation (4)). 15 If the expectation of the structural parameters matters for the exchange rate due to scapegoat e¤ects, must be statistically di¤erent from zero. Also, n should intensify the e¤ect of the true parameter n so that it should take the same sign as the structural parameter. Overall, we …nd that and are strongly signi…cant over both the country and variable dimensions, and that the coe¢ cients intensify the e¤ect of the coe¢ cients (i.e. they have the same sign). These results are generally consistent with the benchmark macro model with constant parameters. However, we now …nd with no exception that higher growth is associated with an appreciating exchange rate, and a current account de…cit with a weaker currency. 16 Another important …nding is the existence of a close link between monthly exchange rate movements and order ‡ow, so that net buying pressure for the foreign currency is associated with a depreciation of the domestic currency. This result con…rms that unobservable fundamentals, proxied by order ‡ow, exert a signi…cant e¤ect on exchange rates. This is a necessary condition for the scapegoat e¤ect to exist, as outlined in Section 2. Table 6 presents the estimates of the time-invariant parameters ( and ) of the scapegoat model with time-varying parameters (T V P SCA in equation (5)). For scapegoat e¤ects to exist, also in this case and should be jointly statistically di¤erent from zero. We …nd that the coe¢ cients are generally signi…cant over both the country and variable dimensions. Most importantly, for all industrialized countries, at least two out of the three coe¢ cients are signi…cant. Also, for EM economies at least one of the coe¢ cients is signi…cant, but for the Polish zloty and the Singaporean dollar all three s are signi…cant, and in two cases for the South Korean won. 17 Moreover, the existence of a close link between monthly exchange rate movements and order ‡ow is con…rmed.
Thus, we again conclude that there is evidence in support of the basic predictions of the scapegoat model.
In-sample …t of scapegoat model
The …rst hypothesis of the scapegoat theory, as formulated in Section 2, is that scapegoat e¤ects are empirically powerful in explaining exchange rate movements. This requires that the scapegoat models (with constant and time-varying parameters) perform satisfactorily in …tting exchange rate ‡uctuations, and outperform the two benchmark exchange rate models, i.e. the constant parameter model and the time-varying parameters model without scapegoat e¤ects given in equations (7) and (8). In this sub-section, we present evidence on the statistical performance of the scapegoat models relative to the benchmark models, using three criteria -the (adjusted) R 2 , an information criterion, and market timing tests.
Speci…cally, Table 7 contains the R 2 , both adjusted and non-adjusted, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and two tests of market timing. In general, the adjusted-R 2 increases when we replace the benchmark speci…cation for constant parameters with the speci…cation for time-varying parameters. More importantly, the explained variances of the scapegoat models, CP SCA and T V P SCA, are much larger than the respective benchmark models, e.g. the CP SCA model performs much better than the respective CP M ACRO benchmark model (with the only exception of the Swiss franc and the UK pound). For some currencies the order of improvement is remarkable:
by means of the scapegoat models, we move from explaining little of the variance of the exchange rate changes to explaining a much larger proportion (e.g. for the euro and the yen where the R 2 s for T V P SCA are 39% and 47% respectively). Moreover, the scapegoat model with time-varying parameters, T V P SCA is generally associated with R 2 s at least as large as the scapegoat model with constant parameters, CP SCA, with the only exception of two EM currencies, namely the Czech koruna and the Mexican peso.
As for the information criterion, Table 7 To complete the model-…t analysis, we consider a set of tests for market timing ability of the competing models, including the 'hit'ratio (HR). The latter is calculated as the proportion of times the sign of the …tted value correctly matches the one of the realized change in the exchange rate. We also employ the test statistic proposed by Henriksson and Merton (1981) . The HM test is asymptotically equivalent to a one-tailed test on the signi…cance of the slope coe¢ cient in the following regression:
where s t , f s t denote the realized and …tted exchange rate returns, respectively; and I f g is the indicator function that takes the value of 1 when its argument is true and 0 otherwise. Mexican peso. In contrast, the evidence in favor of market timing for the constant parameters models is weak. 18 We thus conclude that the scapegoat model with time-varying parameters, T V P SCA has the highest market timing ability, and the scapegoat models tend to outperform their respective benchmark models over all metrics considered.
Figure 2 provides a visual comparison of the (unconditional) adjusted R 2 s. However, di¤erently from Table 6 , we try to shed light on the drivers of the superior performance of the scapegoat model.
Speci…cally, we look at the two components that di¤erentiate the scapegoat model with time-varying parameters (T V P SCA) from the time-varying parameters model (T V P M ACRO), i.e. the order ‡ow and the pure scapegoat term. So, in addition to the T V P M ACRO and T V P SCA models described above, we consider a variation of the scapegoat speci…cation, where (in equation (5)) is set to zero. In essence, by comparing two speci…cations of the scapegoat model (with and without order ‡ows) we are able to isolate the marginal contribution of order ‡ow and scapegoats to the goodness of …t of the model. To further re…ne the results, we now turn to assessing how the relative contributions of macro factors (loadings on the time-varying parameters), order ‡ow and scapegoat variables evolve over time. Figure 3 presents the rolling adjusted-R 2 for the benchmark model with time-varying parameters, and two speci…cations of the scapegoat model: the restricted speci…cation where is set to zero and the full speci…cation where is estimated. Thus, in Figure 3 the top area (T V P SCA) re ‡ects the marginal contribution of order ‡ow, whereas the middle area (T V P SCA no order ‡ow) re‡ects the marginal contribution of the scapegoat e¤ect. We report the analysis for two industrialized and two EM currencies as examples. Overall, it is apparent that the relative contribution of each of the scapegoat e¤ect faded away, whereas the contribution of order ‡ow and, to a lesser extent, macro factors picked up during the recent crisis. Moreover, the scapegoat e¤ect experienced a sharp and short-lived increase towards the end of the sample when order ‡ow, becoming increasingly important, may have generated rational confusion. By contrast, as far as the euro is concerned, the contribution of macro factors is negligible if compared to order ‡ow and scapegoat variables. The contribution of the scapegoat e¤ect was high throughout the sample, but even higher during the …rst and last two years, whereas order ‡ow was very important in the middle of the sample. Moreover, at the beginning of the sample there was evidence of a clear scapegoat e¤ect, as the large contribution of order ‡ow was associated with an even larger contribution of the scapegoat variables, and the contribution of the macro factors was almost nil.
For the South African rand, the role of macro factors was remarkable throughout the sample, although it became less important over time. By contrast, the scapegoat e¤ect was weak over the central part of the sample. However, in early 2003 and towards the end of the sample, the rising role of order ‡ow is notable, and this may have generated episodes of rational confusion. That said, the two episodes di¤er from each other. For example, the sudden rise of the scapegoat e¤ect at the end of the sample follows a period when order ‡ow has been consistently important. Di¤erently from the other currencies, for the Korean won the scapegoat e¤ect is particularly important for the entire sample, although the scapegoat e¤ect takes its highest values over the …rst part of the sample. It is plausible that investors may have found it rational to blame observable macro fundamentals, in particular over the central years of the sample, when unobservable order ‡ow was also particularly important. In fact, for an episode of rational confusion, or scapegoat e¤ect, to exist it should be associated with episodes when order ‡ow was also important. In sum, also this graphical analysis provides evidence in favor of the importance of scapegoat e¤ects, although these e¤ects vary over time and across countries.
When does a fundamental become a scapegoat?
We now turn to the second hypothesis of the scapegoat theory as formulated in Section 2. Our test investigates whether or not the scapegoat parameter n;t is related to the joint evolution of macro fundamentals and unobservable fundamentals. This is an important question as episodes of rational confusion can only arise, according to the theory, when there are large shocks to the unobservable. During these episodes it becomes rational for agents to blame factors they can actually observe. However, among those observable factors, investors will tend to blame those macroeconomic fundamentals that are out of sync with their longer term equilibrium value. So, there is a scapegoat e¤ect only if both the macro fundamental and the unobservable are large. However, such contingency, though necessary, is not su¢ cient per se. The deviation of the macro factor not only has to be large, but also theoretically consistent with the change in the exchange rate. For instance, take output growth as example. Higher output growth should lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate. Now imagine that as a result of large order ‡ow there is a sharp appreciation of the domestic currency.
At the same time domestic output growth happens to be very negative. Clearly, output growth cannot explain the appreciation. There would have to be strong positive output growth to explain the appreciation. The theory implies that in this case output growth cannot be the scapegoat of the exchange rate.
For this reason, we …rst check whether on average large changes in a macro fundamental, at times when order ‡ow also displays large shocks, are theoretically consistent with directional changes in the exchange rate. Our test is based on the following panel regression of the exchange rate on order ‡ow interacted with a macro factor:
We estimate the regression separately for each of the six macro fundamentals. Order ‡ow is taken with the minus sign so that the expected sign of the parameter 1 should be the one we would expect from regressing the exchange rate on the fundamental. 19 Order ‡ow and the fundamental are selected for di¤erent quantiles, and we select in turn the top 20, 30 and 40 percent of observations. However, a particular observation is selected only if both the fundamental and order ‡ow fall in their respective quantiles. Thus, I ff q n;t ;x q t g takes the value of 1 if f n;t and x t are respectively in their top q percent of observations. This means that both the fundamental and order ‡ow have experienced a su¢ ciently large shock at time t. As mentioned above, this is a necessary condition for the fundamental to become a scapegoat. Moreover, to some extent, the sign of the regression is also important, as it informs us whether the movement of the exchange rate is theoretically consistent with the movement in order ‡ow and the fundamental. 20 Table 8 shows that the estimates largely support the scapegoat theory, as the sign of the regres-sion is generally theoretically consistent. For example, output growth and the current account have the expected negative sign so that positive output growth and a current account surplus are both associated with an appreciation of the exchange rate, when there is also net buying pressure for the currency. These results are robust to the quantile considered. Moreover, we …nd that the short-term interest rate di¤erential is consistent with the forward bias (though the coe¢ cient is now negative, and hence more extreme than in Tables 5 and 6 ), and higher long-term interest rates are associated with a small depreciation of the exchange rate.
So far we have only tested the …rst leg of our second hypothesis. We can now turn to the second part of the test, where we show that the survey weight indeed rises (i.e. a variable becomes a scapegoat) when large changes to the fundamental are associated with a large shock to the unobservable.
In particular, what follows relates the scapegoat weight of a macro variable to the absolute value of the interaction between the macro factor itself and order ‡ow. For simplicity, we assume that only one macro factor is a scapegoat at any one point in time. Take again the example of output growth:
we only select those observations for which market participants attach a high weight to output growth relative to the other macro fundamentals. Therefore, the use of the indicator function excludes those observations for which output growth is not selected as a scapegoat by the investor, i.e. when the value of the survey on output growth is relatively low. This is a reasonable assumption consistent with the original work of Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004) and with the anecdotal evidence that the FX market concentrates on one issue at a time. Thus, our empirical test is based on the following panel regression: n;t = 0 + 1 x t f n;t I f n;t> j;t g I ff q n;t ;x q t g + " t ,
where the indicator function I ff q n;t ;x q t g , consistent with Table 8 , takes the value of 1 if at time t both f n;t and x t are in the top q percent of observations, whereas I f n;t> j;t g takes the value of 1 if the survey on the macro factor n exceeds the values of the remaining two macro factors j 6 = n at each time t. Thus, we repeat the regression separately for each of the six macro fundamentals, and each of the quantiles. Equation (13) closely follows van Wincoop (2009, 2011) , in that in their model the expectation of the structural parameter at time t is determined by the weighted average of time t 1 expectation of the structural parameter and the structural parameter itself, plus a term similar to our (x t f n;t ). This last term is key in their model, as it re ‡ects the scapegoat e¤ect. 21 Table 9 presents the regression results. We …nd that the parameters ( 1 ) take the expected positive sign for all fundamentals and quantiles. This result suggests that n;t is indeed the scapegoat parameter as it consistently increases when both macro fundamentals and order ‡ows become large in absolute value. Table 9 also shows that this statistical relation is strong for all fundamentals, with R 2 s ranging from 22 to 78 percent. Moreover, the t-statistic increases as we move from the top 20 percent of observations to the top 40 percent. In sum, taken together, the two legs of our test give strong support to the scapegoat theory, indicating not only that scapegoat e¤ects are powerful in enhancing the empirical performance of exchange rate models, but also that these e¤ects arise when large unobservable shocks move the exchange rate and the scapegoat experiences a large value, consistent with the theory.
Conclusions
Investors have a tendency to pick individual economic fundamentals as scapegoats for exchange rate movements. There is indeed ample anecdotal evidence that …nancial market participants blame individual fundamentals for exchange rate movements, with such blame often shifting rapidly across di¤erent fundamentals over time. This fact has been conceptualized in a series of seminal papers by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004 , 2011 . The main insight from the scapegoat theory of exchange rates is that investors face uncertainties in the form of unobservables driving exchange rates as well as about the true e¤ect of observable fundamentals. When exchange rates move strongly in response to changes in unobservables, it is rational for investors to blame factors that they can actually observe, and more precisely those macro fundamentals that are out of sync with their longer term equilibrium values.
The present paper constitutes the …rst empirical test of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates.
In our empirical analysis we exploit novel data on exchange rate scapegoats from surveys, as well as proxies of unobservable fundamentals based on proprietary FX order ‡ow. Exchange rate scapegoats stem from monthly surveys of 40-60 …nancial market participants, who are asked to rate on a quantitative scale the importance of a number of macro factors as drivers of a country's exchange rate vis-a-vis its reference currency. We match this survey data with a dataset on FX order ‡ow as a proxy of unobservable factors driving exchange rates. Overall, we test the scapegoat theory over a sample of 12 currencies, equally split between industrialized and emerging countries, over the 2001-2009 period.
We …nd strong empirical support for two key hypotheses derived from the scapegoat theory of exchange rates. First, we estimate two versions of the scapegoat model: one based on constant parameters, and a more general one based on time-varying parameters. The scapegoat model with time-varying parameters performs very well in explaining exchange rate movements, showing a significantly improved performance relative to benchmark models that do not allow for scapegoat e¤ects. This …nding is robust across three di¤erent performance criteria, as well as across currencies and over time. Importantly, the improvement in the explanatory power of the scapegoat model does not only stem from the inclusion of the order ‡ow variable, but also from the inclusion of the scapegoat parameters themselves. This …nding is relevant because it suggests that while order ‡ow is important in accounting for currency movements, the scapegoat parameters have an additional, sizeable explanatory power. Moreover, the simple scapegoat model with constant parameters also does a relatively good job. It generally outperforms the benchmark macro model with constant parameters, and in a few cases also the benchmark model with time-varying parameters. These results are robust not only for currencies of industrialized economies but also for those of several emerging markets.
Second, we …nd that a macroeconomic fundamental is picked and identi…ed by market participants as a scapegoat in periods when it is strongly out of sync from its own longer-term equilibrium and at the same time the unobservable fundamental is large. We also show that large changes in the fundamental, at times when the unobservable displays large shocks, are generally consistent with the direction of changes in the exchange rate. This result is particularly strong for variables such as output growth and the current account, for which the direction of their impact on the exchange rate is theoretically not controversial.
Taken together, our results provide strong support in favor of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates, and clearly suggest that expectations of structural parameters, and their interaction with unobservables, are important for improving our understanding of exchange rate ‡uctuations.
A Appendix: Interpolating Survey Data
This section describes how we interpolate the original survey data by means of the Kalman …lter. 22 Our objective is to construct a monthly time series, using as an input the Consensus Economics survey (see Section 3.1), which is conducted only between 3 to 6 months.
The model can be written in state space form such that the survey data are the observed data and the interpolated monthly surveys are the unobservable state variables. The measurement equation is
where Y t denotes the observed survey and s t the interpolated survey. We also assume that the measurement error is equal to zero, so that we impose that the interpolated survey perfectly matches the observed survey. Moreover, such measurement equation only 'exists'for those times t for which the survey is available.
To complete the state space we need to de…ne the transition equation, and we assume that the interpolated survey evolves as a driftless random walk
where the transition error u t is normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation u . We now illustrate the Kalman Filter, and specify below the relevant prediction equations, the likelihood contribution, and the updating equations.
Prediction s tjt 1 = s t 1jt 1 (A.3)
where I fYt6 =0g is the indicator function which takes the value of 1 if the survey is available and 0 otherwise.
We use the …ltered estimate of the state variable s tjt as our interpolated survey, which we de…ne as t throughout the paper. Therefore, the interpolated survey t only uses the information available up to time t, which is within the information set of the agent. In contrast, by using the smoothed estimates s tjT we would otherwise use future information, which is not available to the agent at the time when expectations are formed.
B Appendix: Bayesian MCMC estimation
This section of the appendix describes the estimation of the constant parameter model, time-varying parameters model, and scapegoat model. We perform a Bayesian estimation of the parameters of the empirical exchange rate models, following Kim and Nelson (1999) and Sargent (2002, 2005) , among others.
B.1 The linear regression algorithm (CP-MACRO and CP-SCA)
This subsection deals with the estimation of the constant parameter models CP M ACRO and CP SCA. Let us consider the following linear regression model
where s t is the log of the nominal exchange rate (de…ned as the foreign price of domestic currency), = ( 1 ; 2 ; ; : : : ; K ) 0 is a K vector coe¢ cients, X t = (X 1;t ; X 2;t ; ; : : : ; X K;t ) 0 is a K vector of regressors a time t, and u t is a disturbance term normally distributed with 0 mean and constant variance 2 . We need to estimate the set of the conditional mean hyperparameters ( ) and the constant variance hyperparameter ( 2 ). We de…ne the following priors: for we assume a Normal prior N( 0 ; V 0 ), where 0 = 0 K and V 0 = I KK ; for 2 we assume an inverse Gamma prior IG(
2 ) with shape and scale parameters v 0 = 1 and d 2 0 = 1, respectively. The Gibbs algorithm consists of the following simple steps:
4. Go to step 2 and iterate 40,000 times beyond a burn-in of 20,000 iterations.
In the CP M ACRO model X t = [f t ] and = [ ], where f t denotes a 3 1 vector of macro fundamentals. By contrast, in the CP SCA model X t = [f t ; f t ; x t ] and = [ ; ; ], where f t is a 3 1 vector of macro fundamentals, t f t is a 3 1 vector of scapegoat parameters t (surveys) times their respective macro fundamentals f t , x t is the unobservable fundamental (order ‡ow) and is the K vector of coe¢ cients. Therefore, in the CP SCA model K = 7.
B.2 Time-varying parameters algorithm (TVP-MACRO)
A model with time-varying parameters displays a non-linear state space representation. The measurement equation is
where the conditional t parameters are now time-varying. To close the model we need to specify the transition equation which describes the law of motion of the parameters. We treat the parameters as a hidden state vector which evolves as a multivariate driftless random walk
where v t is an i.i.d. Gaussian process with mean 0 and covariance Q. We assume that the innovations, (u t ; v t ), are identically and independently distributed normal random variables with mean 0 and covariance matrix
where 2 is the variance for the measurement innovation and Q is the covariance matrix for the state innovations. We assume that the innovations are not correlated. In particular, not only the crosscovariance matrix is equal to 0, but also the Q matrix takes a diagonal form. These assumptions can easily be relaxed but are not crucial to our analysis. What follows outlines the Gibbs sampler algorithm we use to simulate a sample from the joint posterior p 2 ; Q;
T j y T , where the vectors represent the history of the data y T = [ s T , f T ], and states T , up to time T . Thus, the Gibbs sampler consists of sampling conditionally from three blocks, of which two relate to the hyperparameters ( 2 ; Q), and the remaining one to the latent parameters T . Next we describe each of the steps in turn.
Gibbs Step 1: States given hyperparameters
The model is linear with a conditional Gaussian state space representation, so that the joint posterior density of T is simply
The conditional posterior of T can be obtained through a forward run of the Kalman …lter followed by the one of the simulation smoother as in e.g. Carter and Kohn (1994) or Chib and Greenberg (1995) . Given 0j0 and R 0j0 , the Kalman Filter forward recursion are
where tjt E( t j 2 ; Q; y t ), R tjt 1 V ar( t j 2 ; Q; y t 1 ) and R tjt V ar( t j 2 ; Q; y t 1 ) are the mean and, respectively, the predicted and smoothed variance-covariance matrices.
The last forward recursion delivers p T j 2 ; Q; y T = N ( T jT ; R T jT ), the …rst term of the joint posterior (B.7). The simulation smoother instead provides the updated estimates of the conditional means and variances, tjt+1 E( t j t+1 ; 2 ; Q; y t ) and R tjt V ar( t j t+1; 2 ; Q; y t ), respectively.
Speci…cally:
fully determine the remaining densities of equation (B.7),
To obtain an entire sample of the latent parameters T , the simulation smoother works as follows.
, and so forth. Finally, draw
Gibbs
Step 2: Hyperparameter 2 given states Conditional on T and y T , the innovations of the measurement equation are observable so that the conditional density of 2 is independent from Q. When an inverse Gamma prior is combined with a Gaussian likelihood, the posterior has also an inverse Gamma density
with scale and shape parameters
( s t f 0 t t ) 2 1 = 0 + T where the priors are S 0 = 1 and 0 = 1.
Step 3: Hyperparameter Q given states We now focus on drawing the variance-covariance matrix of the coe¢ cients'innovations v t , Q. Conditional on a realization of T , the innovations v t are observable. Moreover, because v t is independent of the other shocks of the model u t ; then is redundant to draw Q. Given an inverse-Wishart prior for Q and a normal likelihood, the posterior of Q has itself an inverse-Wishard distribution
with scale and degrees-of-freedom parameters
Under the assumption of uncorrelated states we set the o¤-diagonal elements of Q d to 0. 23 We iterate over the three steps above for a number of iterations su¢ cient to ensure convergence of the chain to the ergodic distribution. Precisely, we perform 80,000 replications of which the …rst 40,000 are burned-in, and we save 1 every 10 draws of the last 40,000 replications of the chain.
B.3 The scapegoat model (TVP-SCA)
In , the scapegoat model not only includes macro factors with loadings that vary over time (as in our benchmark T V P M ACRO), but also the expectation of future parameters and unobserved fundamentals. Our empirical version of the scapegoat model of ) is the following
where t denotes the surveys which capture the expectation of future parameters and weights the information in the macro factors. In addition, x t is the order ‡ow, which proxies for the unobservable fundamental.
From an econometric point of view, our empirical scapegoat model consists of estimating a model with both time-varying parameters ( t ) and time-invariant parameters ( and ). This means that we need to modify the time-varying parameters algorithm described above. In particular, the conditional distribution of the variance of the measurement error also depends on and so that the scale matrix now becomes
Similarly, the joint posterior density of the states will also depend on and . Thus, in the forward Kalman recursion we modify the …ltered value of the state at time t such that tjt = t 1jt 1 +K t ( s t f 0 t t 1jt 1 ( t f t ) 0 x t ). More importantly, an additional step in the Gibbs sampler is required to draw and . Conditional on the previous draw of the states, we can rewrite the original scapegoat model as
(B.14)
where z t = [ t f t ; x t ] and A = [ ; ] are vectors of independent variables and parameters, respectively, each of dimension (4 1). Now, drawing A is equivalent to the problem of drawing the conditional mean parameters in a linear regression model (see above). We assume a Normal prior distribution, with a 0 = 0 4 and V A;0 = I 4;4 , so that the posterior is also Normal The table presents descriptive statistics for the survey data on exchange rates. "Obs: scape" and "Obs: scape (%)" indicate how many times a variable was the main scapegoat out of the six variables considered, and the percentage share of all observations for which it was the main scapegoat, respectively. The dataset covers the interpolated monthly surveys from March 2001 to August 2009. where st is the monthly exchange rate return (if st increases the domestic exchange rate -either the USD or the EURappreciates). The sample period spans from March 2001 to August 2009. We use three macro factors per country. The selection criterion for the macro factors consists of a general-to-speci…c method, whereby we regress st on the survey ( i;t ) times the respective macro factor (f i;t ) st = 1 1;t f 1;t + 2 2;t f 2;t + 3 3;t f 3;t + ut and we select the three macro factors corresponding to the s that display the highest t -statistics, using the selection procedure described in Section 4. Note that all variables, except the surveys, are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by their standard deviation. s are standardized so that they have unit variance. One-standard deviation con…dence intervals are reported in brackets. ( ) and ( ) indicate that the (27-68) and (16-84) intervals, respectively, do not contain 0. 
Note that all variables, except the surveys, are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by their standard deviation. s are standardized so that they have unit variance. One-standard deviation con…dence intervals are reported in brackets. ( ) and ( ) indicate that the (27-68) and (16-84) intervals, respectively, do not contain 0. 
This model is also de…ned as T V P SCA, whereas T V P M ACRO (not reported) is the benchmark model where and are set to 0. Note that all variables, except the surveys, are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by their standard deviation. s are standardized so that they have unit variance. One-standard deviation con…dence intervals are reported in brackets. ( ) and ( ) indicate that the (27-68) and (16-84) intervals, respectively, do not contain 0. The table provides several measures of model …t such as measures of explained variance, information criteria and market timing. As for the information criteria, ln(RSS/T) is common to both the AIC and BIC (not reported), whereas the two di¤er in the way they penalize for the extra parameters. The HM test is a one-tailed test on the signi…cance of the slope coe¢ cient in the following regression:
o + "t;
where st and f st denote the realized and …tted exchange rate returns, and I is the indicator function equal to unity when its argument is true and 0 otherwise. A positive and signi…cant ' HM 1 provides evidence of market timing. Precisely, we report under HM c ' 1 and in parentheses its standard error calculated using Newey-West (1987) . The table presents the regression of the exchange rate return on the order ‡ow times the macro factor: st = 0 + 1 ( xt fn;t) I n f q n;t ;x q t o + ut:
The order ‡ow is taken with the minus sign so that the expected sign should be the one we would expect from regressing the exchange rate return on the fundamental. The order ‡ow and the fundamental are selected for di¤erent quantiles ranging from 20 to 40 percent. Precisely, we sort each variable in absolute value and we take the largest 20, 30 and 40 percent of the observations, and the observation is selected only if in that period both the fundamental and order ‡ow are included in their respective quantiles. N I denotes the number of times the fundamental times order ‡ow is selected for each quantile. Thus, I n f q n;t ;x q t o takes the value of 1 if at time t both fn;t and xt are in the top q percent of observations. This means that both the fundamental and order ‡ow have experienced a su¢ ciently large shock. The regression is estimated using robust estimation; by default, the Matlab algorithm uses iteratively re-weighted least squares with a bisquare weighting function. The table displays the results for the six panel regressions of the survey ( n;t) on the absolute value of the correspondent macro factor (fn;t) times the order ‡ow (xt) times the indicator functions I f n;t > j;tg and I n f q n;t ;x q t o . The latter takes the value of 1 if the survey on the macro factor n exceeds the values of the other two macro factors j 6 = n at each time t. For a generic survey n;t we estimate n;t = 0 + 1 xt f n;t I n f q n;t ;x q t o I f n;t > j;tg + "t,
where n is an index of macro variable and t is an index of time. For each of the six regressions, a country macro variable is included or not according to whether it was previously selected in Table 4 using the general-to-speci…c criterion. For example, for n = Growth we only use CAD, EUR, JPY, CHF, GBP, and ZAR. Similarly to Table 8 , N I denotes the number of times the fundamental times order ‡ow is selected for each quantile. In addition, within these N I observations, N II denotes the number of times the fundamental n exceeds the values of the other two macro factors j 6 = n. And R 2 N adj is the adjusted R 2 computed over the N II observations. The regression is estimated using robust estimation; by default, the Matlab algorithm uses iteratively re-weighted least squares with a bisquare weighting function. The …gures show the percentage adjusted-R 2 for the benchmark model with time-varying parameters (T V P M ACRO), and two speci…cations of the scapegoat model with time-varying parameters: the full speci…cation where is estimated (T V P SCA) and the restricted speci…cation where is set to zero (T V P SCA with no order ‡ow). The …rst panel refers to the industrialized countries, whereas the second to emerging market economies. The …gure shows the rolling percentage adjusted R 2 for the benchmark model with time-varying parameters (T V P M ACRO), and two speci…cations of the scapegoat model: the full speci…cation where is estimated (T V P SCA) and the restricted speci…cation where is set to zero (T V P SCA with no order ‡ow). The sample spans from February 2002 to August 2009 and covers the Canadian dollar (CAD), euro (EUR), South African rand (ZAR) and Korean won (KRW).
